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Abstract
This paper examines the economic returns from participating in a subsidized voca-
tional education program in stitching and tailoring offered to women residing in certain
disadvantaged areas of New Delhi, India. The availability of pre and post-training data
in an experimental framework allows us to measure the effects of participating in this
program on employment, hours worked, job search, earnings, female empowerment,
entrepreneurship and measures of life satisfaction. The program, in less than a year,
has generated substantial improvement in labor market outcomes for these women.
In particular, we find that women who were randomly offered the training program
are almost five percentage points more likely to be employed, six percentage points
more likely to look for a job and on an average work two additional hours in the post-
training period compared to those who were not offered the training. We find that
during the post-training period, women in the treatment group earn twice as much as
women in the control group. There is a also a large increase in ownership of sewing
machine in the post-training period. The program impacts are much larger for women
who completed the training program. We also find that the program effects vary with
participants’ intrinsic preferences for risk, competition, and confidence. Finally, a sim-
ple cost-benefit analysis suggests that the program is highly cost effective and there
are considerable gains from both continuing the program in the current location and
replicating it in different locations.
Keywords: Vocational education, Panel data, India, Economic returns, Labor mar-
ket
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Many countries, faced with nagging unemployment on one hand, and increased demand
for specialized labor in manufacturing and service sectors on the other, have promoted vo-
cational training programs (Grubb, 2006).1 There now exists a fairly large literature that
assesses the impact of participating in such programs on earnings and employment oppor-
tunities using data from developed countries.2 The general conclusions that arise from the
US and European experiences is that the impacts of job training are generally modest at
best, and that the effectiveness of training varies with the characteristics of participants
and the type of training (see Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) and Kluve (2006) for
systematic reviews). However, applying these findings to developing countries might be
inappropriate as the returns to training may be higher in developing countries due to very
low existing levels of formal education, skill accumulation and full-time employment.
Evidence on the effectiveness of training in developing countries is more limited. Betcher-
man, Olivas, and Dar (2004), for example, in their review of 69 impact evaluations of
unemployed and youth training programs, find only 19 in developing countries. They
conclude that training impacts in developing countries are stronger than the impacts of
programs in the United States and Europe. Nopo and Saavedra (2003) in their review of
training programs in Latin America essentially reach the same conclusion. However, the
large majority of the programs analyzed in these surveys are non-experimental in nature.
Experimental evaluation of labor market training programs in developing countries is fairly
rare.3 Two exceptions include Card, Ibarraran, Regalia, Rosas, and Soares (2011) and At-
tanasio, Kugler, and Meghir (2011). The results from these papers are quite mixed. Card,
Ibarraran, Regalia, Rosas, and Soares (2011), using data from a government subsidized
training program for low-income youth in urban areas of the Dominican Republic, find
1Vocational education or vocational education and training (VET) is an education that prepares
trainees for jobs that are based on manual or practical activities, traditionally non-academic, and
totally related to a specific trade, occupation, or vocation. It is sometimes referred to as tech-
nical education as the trainee directly develops expertise in a particular group of techniques. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vocational education. Australia, Finland, England, Germany, Netherlands,
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Spain, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Paraguay, United States, India,
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, are some of the countries that have designed such programs. See Annex
2 of Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar (2004) for a complete list of countries and details on skill building and
other labor market training programs that they offer.
2See Ashenfelter (1978), Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Card and Sullivan (1988), to more recent
work by Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2006).
3This is despite the fact that both LaLonde (1986) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985) make a strong
case for the use of experimental evaluation methods.
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that the program only marginally improved hourly wages and the probability of health
insurance coverage, conditional on employment and find no significant impact of the train-
ing program on the subsequent employability of trainees. Attanasio, Kugler, and Meghir
(2011), on the other hand, are more positive. Using data from a randomized training
program aimed at disadvantaged youth introduced in Colombia in 2005, they find that
the program raised earnings and employment for women and using a simple cost-benefit
analysis of the results argue that the program generates much larger net gains than those
found in developed countries.4
This paper adds to this limited literature by examining the impact of participating in a
labor market training/vocational education program in India.5 To the best of our knowl-
edge, there are no experimental evaluations of vocational education programs in Asia and
in particular, India. The country provides an interesting setting for this study for two
reasons - high economic growth accompanied by rising inequality and skill shortage. The
economic transformation that has happened in India over the last two decades has been
one of the great success stories of our times. As stifling government regulations have been
lifted, entrepreneurship has flourished, and the country has become a high-powered centre
for skill based industries. On the back of this development India has been termed as the
next economic super power. During the same period India also enjoyed a growth rate
of 7 percent per annum, a far cry from the so-called Hindu rate of growth that formed
the upper bound on the growth rate in the three decades prior to the period of economic
reforms. This has been accompanied by significant reduction in rates of poverty across
the country. However, it is also now accepted that inequality has increased, indicating
that many sections of the population are unable to benefit from the phenomenal growth
process that the country as a whole has experienced. It has been argued that individuals,
at least in certain sections of the society lack the necessary skills that can enable them to
take advantage of the opportunities potentially coming their way. Indeed the World Bank
4Hicks, Kremer, Mbiti, and Miguel (2012) and Field, Linden, and Wang (2012) are currently conducting
similar evaluations in Kenya and Mongolia respectively. The results of both these projects are as yet
unavailable. Fiala, Martinez, and Blattman (2011) examine the effectiveness of a cash transfer program
in Uganda that provided thousands of young people nearly unconditional, unsupervised cash transfers to
pay for vocational training, tools, and business start-up costs. They find that despite a lack of central
monitoring and accountability, most youth invest the transfer in vocational skills and tools. Second, the
economic impacts of the transfer are large: hours of non-household employment double and cash earnings
increase by nearly 50% relative to the control group. Macours, Premand, and Vakis (2012) find that
in the context of Nicaragua access to vocational training in conjunction with a conditional cash transfer
program enable households to insure against weather related shocks. They argue that combining safety nets
with productive interventions can help households manage future weather risks and promote longer-term
program impacts.
5We use the terms vocational education and training program interchangeably throughout the paper.
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identifies skill shortage as one of the major constraints to sustained growth in the Indian
economy (Blom and Saeki, 2011). At the same time entrepreneurs have been complain-
ing of an acute shortage of skilled manpower resulting in supply side bottlenecks that is
having a significant negative impact on the growth process. In a survey conducted by the
Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), entrepreneurs indicate
the lack of skilled work force as a major bottleneck to growth (see FICCI, 2011).6 There
are therefore significant potential growth implications from training programs of this kind.
Despite this excess demand for skilled labor force, it is not clear (at least in the Indian
context) what the economic returns from participating in vocational education programs
are? The objective of this paper is to fill this gap by analyzing the economic and so-
cial returns to a subsidized, six month long training program in stitching and tailoring
conducted by two local NGOs in New Delhi, India. The program was offered to women
between ages 18 and 39 years who have completed at least five or more grades of schooling
and reside in certain disadvantaged areas of New Delhi in India. Every woman residing
in these selected areas satisfying the criteria was invited to apply for the program. Those
who applied for the program were randomly assigned into two groups - treatment (women
who were offered the training) and control (women who were not offered the training).
The experimental design along with the availability of pre-and post-training data allows
us to estimate the causal effects of this program on labor market outcomes, measures of
women’s empowerment and entrepreneurship. Finally, both before and after the training,
all applicants (irrespective of whether they were randomly allocated to the treatment or
the control group) were requested to participate in an artefactual field experiment designed
to measure their risk tolerance, competitiveness and confidence. Our experimental design
also allows us to obtain causal estimates of being offered the training on these selected
behavioral/intrinsic characteristics.
The follow-up data was collected six months after the completion of the program and hence
the pre and post-training data used here can only measure the short-run gains from being
offered the training. We find that the program, even in this very short time has generated
substantial improvement in labor market outcomes for these women. In particular, we find
that women who were randomly offered the training program are almost five percentage
points more likely to be employed, six percentage points more likely to look for a job and on
6The Economist in a recent article on the state of the Indian economy concur with this view and the
specific example they cite to illustrate the extent of skill shortage is garment makers in India not being
able to find workers with the basic level of skill (Banyan, 2011).
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an average work two additional hours in the post-training period compared to those who
were not offered the training. We find that during the post-training period, women in the
treatment group earn nearly three times that of women in the control group. There is a also
a large increase in the ownership of sewing machine in the post-training period. However
there were externalities associated with the program - the program provided more that
just skills. It increased the relative confidence of the participants, which can potentially
have significant impacts on other dimensions of the lives of these women. The program
impacts are much larger for women who completed the training program. We also find
that the program effects vary with participants’ intrinsic preferences for risk, competition,
and confidence. Finally a simple cost-benefit analysis suggests that the program is highly
cost effective and there are considerable gains from both continuing the program in the
current location and replicating it in different locations.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 The Program
The vocational education program in stitching and tailoring services was jointly adminis-
tered by two non-governmental organizations (NGOs): Pratham Delhi Education Initiative
(henceforth Pratham) and Social Awakening Through Youth Action (henceforth Satya)
in selected disadvantaged areas (or resettlement colonies) in New Delhi, India. Pratham
is one of the largest NGO’s in India reaching out to more than 3 million underprivileged
children with their education initiatives all across India. Satya, on the other hand, is a
small NGO which specializes in providing skill development programs to residents in poor
communities. Pratham and Satya partnered to provide a rigorous six month long training
program in stitching and tailoring services with the aim of making women in these areas
adept in making clothes for children, and for adult men and women.
In May 2010, a complete census was administered in the targeted areas in New Delhi as
identified by Pratham. While the targeted areas are commonly referred to as slums, these
are permanent settlements, with concrete houses, and some public amenities (electricity,
water, etc.). To be more specific, these are resettlement colonies, typically 10−20 years old,
that have absorbed large in-flows (migrants from other parts of the country) during New
Delhi’s recent expansion. All eligible women residing in the target areas were informed of
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the program through an extensive advertising campaign that lasted for almost 3 weeks,
and were invited to apply to have a chance at being selected to receive this training. The
potential applicants were also informed of the associated details of the program such as,
the location of the training centers, the extent of commitment required (participants were
required to commit up to two hours per day in a five-day week), the method of selection
(random), course content and the expected time-span of the program (six months, starting
August 2010). All selected participants were required to deposit Rs 50 per month for
continuing in the program. This required participants to be ready to commit a total of
Rs 300 for the entire duration of the training program with a promise from the NGOs
that women who stayed through the entire duration of the program would be repaid Rs
350.7 Finally the potential participants were also told that they would receive a certificate
on completing the program. The english version of the advertisement for the program
is presented in Figure 1. Satya and Pratham employees held joint information sessions,
where women had the opportunity to meet with representatives from the two NGOs to
discuss and clarify questions about the program. By the end of June 2010, Pratham
received 658 applications.
Two-third of all applications were randomly assigned to the treatment group (women who
were offered a spot in the program) and the remaining one-third were assigned to the
control group (women who were not offered a place in the program). The program was
conducted in two areas of New Delhi, South Shahdara and North Shahdara. Randomiza-
tion was conducted at the area level, i.e., two-third of the applicants from each area (that
is, 164 of the 244 applicants from South Shadara and 278 of the 414 applicants from North
Shahdara) were assigned to the treatment group. North Shahdara is a bigger geographical
cluster and therefore, received more applications and had 3 training centers; the remaining
2 training centres were in South Shahdara. Women were assigned to the training center
nearest to their home and for classes, alloted their most preferred time, though they had
the option of changing both if necessary. The average time taken to walk from the partici-
pants’ home to the training center is approximately 13 minutes in North Shahdara and 10
minutes in South Shahdara. The actual program started during the second/third week of
August 2010 and continued through to the last week of January 2011. The baseline survey
was conducted during the period July - August 2010 and the follow-up survey during the
7This feature is unique to the program and was introduced by the implementing NGOs to increase
commitment and encourage regular attendance. The amount of Rs 50 per month was around one percent
of the average household income for the population. All eligible women were informed of this deposit
requirement in the advertisement (and prior to applying).
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same two months in 2011. Figure 2 provides a schematic representation of the chronology
of events.
2.2 Data - Baseline, Follow-up and Attrition
2.2.1 Baseline Data
The baseline socio-economic survey, conducted in July - August 2010 attempted to survey
all 658 women who applied to the program; however, survey data could only be collected
for 90 percent of the applicants due to respondent’s unavailability and occasional refusal
to participate in the survey. The completion rates were fortunately, only marginally higher
in the treatment group (92 percent) compared to the control group (86 percent) and the
difference is not statistically significant. Our baseline data consists of 594 women, of whom
409 belong to the treatment group and the remaining 185 belong to the control group.
The household questionnaire was designed to collect detailed information on household
demographic characteristics, ownership of household assets and household loans, labor
market outcomes, quality of life and measures of bargaining power. The list of outcome
variables is presented in Panels A and C of Table 1
An immediate implication of our evaluation design is that none of the baseline charac-
teristics must be significantly different between the treatment and the control group. To
test this assumption, we report pre-intervention averages of all variables used later in the
regression analysis. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report sample averages for the treatment
and the control group respectively. Column 4 reports mean differences between the two
groups and the statistical significance of this difference. There are no systematic differ-
ences in labor market outcomes between the treatment and the control group; the only
exception is job search, where women in the control group are more likely to look for a job
than women in the treatment group. Women in the two groups also exhibit similar levels
of happiness and bargaining power (empowerment), captured by ROSCA membership and
control over resources within the household.8 Women in the control group though appear
to be significantly more likely to own a sewing machine in the baseline compared to women
in the treatment group. The average woman in our sample is 22 years old and more than
8Anderson and Baland (2002) propose an explanation of membership of roscas in Kenya (similar to
chit funds in India) based on conflictual interactions within the household. In their paper, participation
in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate
consumption. So membership in a rosca could be viewed as a measure of bargaining power of the woman.
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fifty percent of these women have not completed secondary schooling. About one-third of
the women in our sample are married and there is an almost equal distribution of both
Hindu and Muslim women in our sample. More than fifty percent of the women belong
to scheduled castes. At the baseline, women in the control group appear to be twelve
percentage points more likely to have prior experience in stitching and tailoring compared
to women in the treatment group. We will be controlling for these baseline characteristics
in our main regressions to account for any remaining pre-intervention differences between
the two groups. Finally as the F-statistics presented in column 5 in Table 2 show, none
of the explanatory variables or outcome variables affect the likelihood of a woman being
assigned to the treatment group.
Table 3 summarizes pre and post training differences in the outcome variables of interest.
Here the pre-training sample is restricted to women who are surveyed in both 2010 and
2011. Notice that while pre-training differences between the treatment and control group
is small and never statistically significant, the corresponding post-training differences be-
tween the groups increases substantially, in particular, for all labor market outcomes and
ownership of sewing machines. These differences are corroborated below (see Section 4).
While it is true that women who receive the TRAINING are significantly more likely to
search for a job post-training, there is no evidence that they were significantly more likely
to search for a job in stitching and tailoring related occupations. This appears to suggest
that the benefit of the program was not only in providing with skills to earn and contribute
to household income, but also to instill a sense confidence in them that makes them more
willing to venture out of their home and search for a job, any job, not necessarily one
related to stitching and tailoring. Indeed as we show below (see Table 11), women who
receive the TRAINING are significantly more confident of their relative ability, compared
to women in the control group. This is manifested in an increased likelihood of job search.
In terms of actual employment however women who receive the TRAINING are signifi-
cantly more likely to be employed (both in casual wage employment and in full-time wage
employment) in stitching/tailoring related occupations. Additionally women who receive
the TRAINING appear to be in the same job longer.
2.2.2 Follow-up Data and Attrition
During July - August 2011, approximately 6 months after the training program was com-
pleted, we requested all women who completed the baseline survey to participate in a
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follow-up survey. Attempts were made to track every woman who was in our final 2010
sample. Despite all efforts, we were unable to trace 90 of the 594 women, resulting in an
overall attrition rate of 15 percent. The attrition rate is however not significantly different
between the treatment and the control groups: 15.6 percent attrition in the treatment
group and 14 percent in the control group (p− value = 0.6166).9
Our identification strategy also relies on the assumption of non random attrition between
women in the treatment and the control groups as any systematic difference in attrition
rates between the two groups can bias program effects. In Table 4 we present the baseline
differences in the outcome variables of interest between attritors and non-attritors for
both the treatment and the control group. Mean differences in outcome variables between
the non-attritors and attritors in the treatment group are not statistically significantly
different from average differences between attritors and non-attritors in the control group
(see column 7), indicating that there is no evidence of differential attrition between the two
groups. To examine how the baseline socio-economic characteristics affect the likelihood
of attrition, in Table A-1 in Appendix A.1, we present the marginal effects from a probit
regression, where, the dependent variable is attrite which takes a value 1 if the woman
could not be traced during the follow-up and 0 otherwise. We find that an additional year
in age increases the likelihood of attrition by 0.8 percentage point. The results on attrition
are robust to the inclusion of the time taken (in minutes) to wak to the training center.10
In particular, we find that the time taken to walk to the training center has no impact
on the likelihood of attrition. We also regress the different outcome variables of interest
at the baseline, on the baseline observables, the attrition dummy (attrite), the treatment
dummy (treatment) and a set of interaction terms between the attrition dummy and each
of the explanatory variables. The non-interacted coefficients give us the effects for the non-
attrited women while the interacted coefficients give us the difference between the attritors
and non-attritors at the baseline. A test of the joint significance of the attrite dummy
and the interaction terms tells us whether the attriting women are different from the non-
attriting women. The results are presented in Tables A-2 and A-3 in the Appendix. The
null hypothesis that the attriting women are no different from the non-attriting women
9The attrition rates found here are comparable to other papers in this literature. For example, At-
tanasio, Kugler, and Meghir (2011) are unable to follow around 18.5 percent of their baseline sample after
about 13 − 15 months after the conclusion of their program and Card, Ibarraran, Regalia, Rosas, and
Soares (2011) are unable to track around 20 percent of their baseline sample 18 − 24 months after their
initial application into the program.
10The time taken to walk to the training center is not self-reported. It is the time taken by an employee
of Pratham to walk from each respondent’s home to the training center she is assigned to. Therefore this
measure does not suffer from self-reporting bias.
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(the joint test of the attrite dummy and the interaction terms) is rejected in only 3 out of
the 8 labor market outcome variables and for 1 out of the 5 the other outcome variables
indicating that in general attriting women are no different from the non-attriting women
in terms of the outcome variables of interest at the baseline. Additionally the coefficient
estimate associated with the interaction term treatment × attrite is never statistically
significant in any of the 13 regressions reported in Tables A-2 and A-3.
2.2.3 Program Completion
In our sample, 55% percent of all women assigned to the treatment group were program
completers, i.e., completed the entire program and received a certificate at the end of the
program. On an average program completers (hereafter TRAINED) attended more than
seventy percent of all classes in comparison to program non-completers who only attended
only four percent of all classes during the training period. In panels A and B in Figure
3 we present the average monthly attendance for program completers and non-completers
respectively. We find that among program completers, average attendance is typically
more than 70%, except in November when it falls to 60% due to the popular religious
festival of Diwali. Average monthly attendance among program non-completers starts out
at around 16% in the beginning of the program in August 2010 and steadily declines to
3% towards the end of the program in January 2011. This suggests that majority of the
drop-outs occurred right at the beginning of the program.
Conversations with women who did not complete the program revealed that distance to
the training centre (from place of residence), lack of available childcare options and the
fact that friends were not selected for the program were some of the main reasons for
non completion (dropping out). We conducted a probit regression where the dependent
variable (TRAINED) takes the value of 1 if the woman (in the treatment group) completed
the entire program and received a certificate at the end of the program and 0 if she
dropped out. The sample here is restricted to women who were assigned to receive the
TRAINING i.e., women in the treatment group. The marginal effects from the probit
regression are presented in Table 5. Women who have completed secondary schooling are
21 percentage points more likely to complete the training program. Women who have
completed secondary schooling are more likely to be able to internalize the benefits of
training and gain more from the program. While there is no evidence to suggest that the
lack of childcare options restrict the ability of the women to maximize their benefits from
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the program, the distance to the training center captured by the time taken to walk to
the training center does. A 10 minute increase in the time taken to walk to the training
center results in a 1 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of program completion.
3 Estimation Strategy
The panel dimension of the data along with the randomized evaluation design implemented
here allows us to estimate the causal effects of the training program on labor market and
other socio-economic outcomes. We estimate the following model to control for baseline
differences in the outcome variables and also for any pre-program differences between the
treatment and the control group.
Yi = β0 + β1TRAININGi +
K∑
j=1
γjXij + εi (1)
Here Yi is an outcome of interest for woman i; TRAININGi is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the woman is offered the training (i.e., is assigned to the treatment
group); 0 otherwise. So β1 measures the causal effect of the vocational training program
on the outcome variables of interest. Note that even if a woman dropped out through
the course of the program, she remains assigned to the treatment group, as a result, β1
captures the intent to treat (ITT) effect of the program. X is a set of additional individual
and household level characteristics that control for any remaining pre-intervention differ-
ences between women in the two groups. The X’s also include baseline (lagged) outcome
variables to control for path dependence in labor market outcomes which further improves
the precision of the estimates. Finally, εi is the random i.i.d. disturbance term. We use a
version of equation (1) to estimate heterogeneous program effects by restricting the sample
to particular sub-groups (see section 4.3).
The set of pre-treatment (baseline) explanatory variables that we control for in the regres-
sions include: Age of the woman in years, Completed secondary school (= 1 if the woman
completed ten grades of schooling; 0 otherwise), SC (= 1 if the respondent belongs to a
scheduled caste; 0 otherwise), Hindu (= 1 if religion = Hindu; 0 otherwise), Experience in
stitching and tailoring, a self-reported measure of prior experience in stitching and tailor-
ing service (=1 if the woman had any prior experience; 0 otherwise), Married (= 1 if the
woman is married; 0 otherwise), Dependency ratio defined as the ratio of the number of
children under age 5 to the number of adult females in the household, and a dummy for
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residence in North Shahdara.
4 Results
4.1 Effect of TRAINING: ITT Estimates
Panel A of Table 6 reports the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates, capturing the causal effect
of being offered the training program on a number of different labor market outcomes.
The likelihood of casual employment, self-employment, any employment, hours worked,
job search and monthly wage earnings are all significantly higher for women who are
offered the TRAINING. The program increases the likelihood of casual wage employment
and self-employment by 5 percentage points, increases the likelihood of any employment by
6 percentage points, increases the likelihood of job search by 6.4 percentage points, hours
worked by almost 2 hours and monthly wage earnings by Rs 135. Notice that for women
not offered the TRAINING, the average hours worked is 1.18 while the average monthly
wage earnings is Rs 80. TRAINING therefore doubles the hours worked and increased
the monthly wage earnings by more than 150 percent. The effect of TRAINING on the
likelihood of obtaining full-time wage employment and on earnings from self-employment
are also positive, though the effects are not statistically significant. We do however need
to bear in mind that while in percentage terms these are very large effects on earnings, in
absolute terms they are still very small. Note however these are unconditional effects - the
regressions on hours worked, monthly wage earnings and earnings from self-employment
are not conditional on working.
Turning to hours worked, monthly wage earnings and earnings from self-employment,
conditional on working, on casual or full-time wage employment and conditional on being
self-employed, we find that TRAINING results in a significant increase in hours worked
and a positive but not a statistically significant effect on the monthly wage earnings. The
effect of TRAINING on earnings from self-employment is actually negative, though not
statistically significant. However this appears to be driven by the presence of 8 women,
which makes up approximately a-third of all women who are in self-employment, report-
ing 0 earnings from self-employment. The conditional effects on hours worked and on
monthly wage earnings are both large: the average hours worked in the week prior to the
survey is 23 hours for women in the control group; women who receive TRAINING work
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roughly 10 hours more per week. Similarly women in the control group earn Rs 1600 per
month on an average; TRAINING increases monthly wage earnings by almost Rs 900 per
month, which is almost 60% of the wage earnings of those women in the control group.
A comparison of the conditional and unconditional effects suggest that the main effect is
coming from increased participation rather than through an increase in productivity (and
wage rate). However given the extremely small sample size (very few women report being
employed/working), one must be careful in interpreting these numbers.
TRAINING has a positive and statistically significant effect on ownership of capital goods
and entrepreneurship - women who receive the TRAINING are 15 percentage points more
likely to own a sewing machine (see Panel B in Table 6). This increase in the likelihood
of owning a sewing machine could be viewed as a measure of entrepreneurship. During
informal conversations with program participants, we asked participants as to why they
wished to participate in the program and the majority responded saying, “we want to
use this skill to increase income or set up our own small businesses”; purchasing a sewing
machine can be viewed as the first step in this direction. On the other hand TRAINING
has no effect on empowerment and measures of life satisfaction, defined by happiness at
home or work (see Panel B in Table 6).
The effects on labor market participation and hours worked that we obtain are similar to
those obtained for the female sample by Attanasio, Kugler, and Meghir (2011), particularly
when we look at the effects on the probability of employment and on hours worked.
However we obtain much stronger effects on earnings. The effects are systematically
higher compared to those obtained by Card, Ibarraran, Regalia, Rosas, and Soares (2011),
who find very small effects on the likelihood of work and about a 10% increase in the
average monthly earnings of participants.
In the follow-up survey conducted in July-August 2011 (six months after the completion of
the program) we asked whether the applicants (both women who received the TRAINING
and women who did not) planned to participate in any stitching and tailoring related
activities in the next six months - for example stitch for others and charge money for
it, work in a factory that makes clothes, be an apprentice with a local tailoring shop or
provide private tuition in stitching and tailoring. The strongest effect is on the likelihood
of stitching for others and charging money for it: almost 12% of women who received the
TRAINING report that they are likely to stitch for others and charge money for it (thereby
contributing to household income). A large fraction of women who applied to the program
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(more than 44%) reported (prior to the survey) that the primary reason for applying to
the program was to increase future earnings. Behavior post-training is consistent with
this desire.
Women appear to be using the skills that they have accumulated productively. Almost
23% of women who received the TRAINING report that they had stiched something on
their own in the six months prior to the follow-up survey; 6% of women who received
the TRAINING had stitched at least one item of men’s clothing in the month prior to
the follow-up survey, 22% had stitched at least one item of woman’s clothing and 6% had
stitched at least one item of children’s clothing in the month prior to the follow-up survey.
The corresponding percentages for women in the control group are 3, 7 and 1 percent.
4.2 Inference with Multiple Outcomes
Since we are interested in the impact of the training program for over 13 outcome variables
of interest, the probability of a false positive, that is, Type I error increases in the number
of outcomes tested. To rule out some of this concern, we examine the ITT effects of the
training program on summary indices using the approach outlined in Kling, Liebman,
and Katz (2007). Similar to Karlan and Zinman (2009) we construct: (a) an overall index
using 12 of the 13 outcome variables of interest, and (b) summary indices constructed over
domains of related outcomes. The specific domains of interest to us are - casual/full-time
employment index (casual wage employment, full-time employment, hours worked, job
search, and monthly earnings), self-employment index (self-employment, earnings from
self-employment, and ownership sewing machine), and empowerment and happiness index
(control over resources, rosca participation, happy at home, and happy at work). The index
method requries all variables to be converted into z-scores. The z-scores are constructed
for each outcome variable using the mean and the standard deviation of the control group
as the reference group. A higher value of the z-score necessarily implies an improvement.
We take an equally weighted average of all the standaradized outcomes within a domain
to construct the indices.
We estimate equation (1) using the index measures as the outcome variables of interest.
The coefficient estimates associated with TRAINING on the index variables reported in
Table 7 indicates a strong positive and statistically significant impact of the training
program on labor market outcomes. However, the training program has no impact on
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measures of empowerment and happiness. The overall index reject the null hypothesis
that the training has no effect on the outcome variables of interest in this paper alleviating
concerns with incorrect inference.
4.3 Sub-group Average Treatment Effects
The results presented in Table 6 give us the ITT estimates of the program for the full
sample. However it is worth investigating whether the effects are different across different
sub-groups. For example Field, Jayachandran, and Pande (2010) explore how traditional
religious and caste institutions in India that impose restrictions on women’s behavior
influence their business activity. Indeed the idea is quite relevant in our context as well.
Caste and religion could impose significant restrictions on mobility and social interactions
of these women, which in turn can result in significant differences in outcomes. Similarly,
one can argue that more educated women or women with prior experience in stitching and
tailoring can better internalize the potential benefits of TRAINING.
To examine the sub-group average treatment effects we estimate the following equation
(this is an extended version of equation (1)):
Yi = β0 + β1TRAININGi + β2(TRAININGi × Zi) +
K∑
j=1
γjXij + εi (2)
where
Zi = {Hindu, SC, Completed secondary school, Experience in stitching/tailoring,
Resident of North Shahdara, Dependency Ratio}
where β1 gives us the effect of the TRAINING program for women not belonging to the
sub-group z ∈ Z and β2 gives us the differential (treatment − control) effect for women
belonging to sub group z. The estimated coefficients for β1 and β2 are presented in Table 8.
We present the results corresponding to the labor market and entrepreneurship variables.11
The interaction terms are almost never statistically significant. The exceptions include -
hours worked, which is significantly lower for SC women receiving the TRAINING; though
the effect is quite weak, significant at 10 percent level of significance. The lower hours
11The results for empowerment and happiness are available on request.
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worked is however not reflected in lower monthly wage earnings or lower earnings from self-
employment. On the other hand, a SC woman who receives TRAINING is 19 percentage
point more likely to own a sewing maching compared to a non SC woman who receives
TRAINING. Finally experienced women (with prior experience in stitching and tailoring)
who receive TRAINING are 15 percentage points ore likely to search for jobs compared to
women without prior experience and receive TRAINING. The difference estimate is never
statistically significant for North Shahdara residents; finally women residing in households
with a high dependency ratio are less likely to own a sewing machine (i.e., are significantly
less likely to be entrepreneurial).
4.4 Effect of Program Intensity: Treatment on the Treated (TOT)
As described in Section 2.2.3 above, not everyone assigned to the treatment group com-
pleted the program and received the certificate at the end of the program. Program
completers attended on an average 89 days of classes, while the non-completers attended
on an average 10 days. This implies that the intensity of the training is likely to be
considerably higher for those women who completed the training. The labor market, em-
powerment, entrepreurship and life satisfaction measures are also likely to depend on the
intensity of training. To examine this issue we estimate a version of equation (1) to obtain
the treatment on the treated (TOT) results. Our estimation strategy exploits random
assignment to the treatment, i.e., being offered the training program. We examine the
impact of program completion (TRAINED) and proportion of days attended (ATTEN-
DANCE) on outcome variables, instrumenting for TRAINED and ATTENDANCE using
initial assignment to the treatment status and its interaction with age and marital sta-
tus as instruments. The first stage F-statistics on the excluded instruments are always
greater than 10 and the Hansen J-statistics are never statistically significant indicating
that the excluded instruments are both strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor
and uncorrelated with the error term in the main specification. The estimated effects for
TRAINED and ATTENDANCE are presented in Table 9.
It is not surprising that the TOT estimates are systematically higher compared to the
ITT estimates. The results presented in Panel A in Table 9 suggest that the effect of
being offered the TRAINING is significantly higher for the program completers. The
TRAINED experience a 9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of obtaining casual
wage employment and self-employment; an 11 percentage point increase in the likelihood
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of obtaining any employment; an 11 percentage point increase in the likelihood of job
search; a 3.5 hour increase in hours worked during the last week and a Rs 245 increase
in monthly wage earnings (an increase of more than 300 percent, relative to the control).
Again it is important to note that these are unconditional effects. While the likelihood of
obtaining full-time employment and income from self-employment are both higher for the
TRAINED the effects are not statistically significant. Finally the likelihood of owning a
sewing machine is 28 percentage points higher for the TRAINED (see Panel B in Table
9).
However even within the set of program completers, there is considerable variation in
the number of days attended (the standard deviation is more than 28 days). However
the results are quite consistent when we use ATTENDANCE as the relevant explanatory
variable. For example, the results suggest that a 1 percent increase in the proportion of
classes attended increases the monthly wage earnings by around Rs 3; this corresponds
to a Rs 210 increase in monthly wage earnings for the average program completer who
attends around 70 percent of the classes, this is close to the Rs 245 increase that we obtain
in column 1.
Program completion involves receiving a certificate from Pratham and Satya stating that
the woman completed a course on stitching and tailoring. So it is worth examining whether
the program impacts presented in Table 9 is indeed the result of accumulation of skill or
is it because of the fact that the program completers are offered a certificate i.e., is this
simply a certificate effect or a sheepskin effect?12 To examine this we estimate the following
equation





Here the estimated coefficient estimate β1 gives the effect of increased attendance for the
non-completers while the β2 is the differential effect for the program completers. A positive
and statistically significant β2 implies obtaining the certificate has an additional effect,
over and above that of skill accumulation, which is measured by the ATTENDANCE
variable. Equation 3 is estimated using IV. The coefficient estimates for β1 and β2 are
12The idea of sheepskin effect is very common when analyzing the returns to education. Employers have
used the education level of applicants as a way of delineating who is qualified for what kinds of jobs. The
preference for college and graduate school degrees is known as the sheepskin effect, so named because the
degree dresses up an applicant but does not necessarily change his/her skills or overall value. The sheepskin
is the actual diploma. See http://www.ehow.com/about 6683865 sheepskin-effect .html
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presented in Table A-4. Notice that β2 is never statistically significant, indicating that
controlling for attendance, program completion (i.e., obtaining the certificate) does not
have an additional effect on any of the outcome variables of interest.
5 Behavioral Impacts
The results so far suggest that there are significant gains from participating in a vocational
education program. The next question is what are some possible pathways through which
training increases labor market outcomes? For instance, it is possible that labor market
training programs increase wage earnings not only through skill accumulation but also
by increasing participants’ overall confidence level and/or intrinsic competitiveness, which
can further explain some of the variation in wage earnings.For example as we have seen,
women who receive the TRAINING are much more likely to search for any job, not
only related to stitching and tailoring. This is possibly an indicator of an increase in
overall confidence level, caused by the program. Therefore in addition to the presence of
such direct effects, training programs could also potentially generate substantial positive
externalities by altering participants’ behavioral traits, which can influence various other
dimensions of well being.
In order to examine if the training program resulted in changes in behavioral characteristics
which would imply that the ITT effects of the program would be over estimated; we
requested a randomly selected sample of the applicants to participate in a set of behavioral
experiments prior to randomization, that is, before learning their treatment status and 6
months after the training program.13 Due to organizational constraints, the behavioral
experiments could only be conducted in South Shahdara. The experiments were conducted
in the Pratham office located in South Shahdara, a prominent and convenient place for all
the participants. Pratham employees were hired to recruit for the behavioral experiments
but the team of recruiters had no information about these experiments. To be more
specific, neither of the NGOs involved had any information on the behavioral experiments
when they conducted the information sessions to advertise for the training program. Of the
224 women residing in South Shahdara who applied for the program, 153 participated in
these behavioral experiments in 2010. However not all the women who participated in the
behavioral experiments actually participated in the baseline survey and we have complete
13The experiments that we conducted fall under the category of artefactual field experiments, using the
categorization developed by Harrison and List (2004).
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baseline data (both experimental and survey) for 146 women. The program participants
were later (after the behavioral experiments) randomly allocated into the treatment (99)
or the control (47) group.
In May-June 2011, approximately five months after the training program was completed,
we invited all the women who participated in the experiments in 2010 back to the Pratham
office to participate in a similar set of experiments as in the previous year. Attempts were
made to track and invite every woman who was in our final 2010 sample. Despite all effort,
we were unable to trace around 15% of the participants in 2010. However, there are no
systematic differences in the attrition rates across the two groups.
In each year, subjects participated in only one session where an average session lasted for
about 2 hours. Each subject participated in two behavioral games. The basic structure
of each game is similar to the games used in previous studies (see for example Gneezy,
Leonard, and List, 2009). The first game was designed to evaluate subjects’ attitudes
towards risk (investment game). In this game, participants were endowed with Rs 50 and
had the option of allocating any portion of their endowment to a risky asset that had a 50
percent chance of quadrupling the amount invested. The invested amount could also be
lost with a 50 percent probability. The subjects retained any amount that they chose not
to invest. The second game was designed to investigate the intrinsic competitiveness of
subjects (competition game). The subjects were required to participate in a real-effort task,
which determined their payoffs in the experiment. The real-effort task consisted of filling
up 1.5 fl oz. zip lock bags with beans in one minute. Prior to the task each subject had
to choose one of two possible methods of compensation. First, a piece-rate compensation
method, which depended solely on her own performance and she would receive Rs 4 for
each correctly filled bag. Second, a competition-rate compensation method where her
earnings would depend on how she performed relative to a randomly chosen subject in the
same session. A subject received Rs 16 per bag if she filled more bags than her matched
opponent. If she filled fewer bags than her opponent, she received nothing. When choosing
their compensation method, the subjects also had to guess their performance in the game,
by answering questions on the number of bags they expected to be able to fill (a measure
of individual/absolute confidence), and their expected rank based on their performance in
the task (a measure of relative confidence).14 In each session, only one of the games was
chosen for payment purposes. We chose the payoffs such that the returns from choosing
14See Dasgupta, Gangadharan, Maitra, Mani, and Subramanian (2012) for more details on the experi-
ment.
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the riskier alternative were comparable in the two games. In both the games, choosing
the riskier outcome gave four times higher payoffs compared to the riskless option.15
Finally in the main survey (both in the baseline and in the follow-up) we collected in-
formation on time preference. Subjects were asked whether they would prefer Rs 100
today or Rs 150 in a months time and whether they would prefer Rs 100 today and Rs
200 in a months time.16 We use this information to define two different measures of time
preference: Willing to Wait 150, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the woman prefers Rs 150 in a month and Willing to Wait 200, which takes the value of
1 if the woman prefers Rs 200 in a month. Note that these choices are not incentivized
and are essentially hypothetical choices. Additionally this data was collected using the
socio-economic survey and so we have the time preference data for the entire sample.
The primary question that we examine is: Does TRAINING cause changes in the behav-
ioral/intrinsic characteristics of the women? As before, the panel dimension of the data
on behavioral characteristics along with a randomized evaluation design implemented here
allows us to measure the causal effects of the vocational training program on behavioral
outcomes. We estimate a variant of equation (1).
Bi = β0 + β1TRAININGi +
K∑
j=1
γjXij + εi (4)
Bi is decision of made woman i in the behavioral experiment. The remaining variables are
defined as in equation (1). The full set of outcome variables that we consider are presented
in Panel C in Table 1.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 10 report the sample averages for the treatment and control
group respectively. Column 4 reports mean differences between the treatment and the
control group. There are very little systematic differences between the treatment and
15We made small changes to the above described game in 2011 to disentangle the effect of familiarity
with these games to changes in behavior. In the investment game, instead of using a coin toss to determine
the success or failure of the investment, we chose to roll a die where if {1, 2, 3} determined success of
the investment and {4, 5, 6} resulted in failure of the investment. In the competition game, we slightly
changed the size of the zip lock bag and the type of bean used in the real effort task to make it difficult
for participants to use last years’ performance as a benchmark.
16Specifically the question was: Suppose you have won a lottery today. You are given two options of
how you can receive your prize. Would you prefer a prize of Rs 100 guaranteed today or a prize of Rs 150
guaranteed in one month. You do not have to be afraid that you might not receive the money if you postpone
the payment. The prizes are a sure thing today and in one month. Please make your decisions based on how
you expect you would answer if the choice were actual and not hypothetical. We had a follow-up question
where the alternatives were Rs 100 today or Rs 200 in a month.
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control women in terms of both socioeconomic and behavioral characteristics. Women in
the treatment group (receiving TRAINING) are older and are more likely to be married
though the difference in both these cases is quite weak. Women in the treatment group
are more confident about their relative abilities, that is, their perceived rank within the
group is significantly higher compared to that of women in the control group. Finally,
compared to women in the control group, women in the treatment group appear to be
less willing to wait a month irrespective of the returns at the end of the month, though
the difference is statistically significant only when the alternative is Rs 150 after a month.
What is interesting is that the majority of women are present biased - overall only around
30% of the women in the sample (applicants) would be willing to wait for a month to
receive Rs 150 by giving up Rs 100 today. Not surprisingly, the proportion willing to wait
is higher when the returns from waiting is higher, but even this is less than 50%.
Table 11 report the effect of TRAINING program on behavioral characteristics. These re-
sults suggest that while there is very little effect of TRAINING on the proportion invested
in the risky asset, choice of the competitive payment option in the competition game and
self assessment about the number of bags that the woman can fill (absolute confidence)
and time preference (irrespective of the returns from waiting), there is a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect on relative confidence (captured by self ranking): women who
receive the TRAINING expect to do better in the real effort task, relative to the other
women in her session. One implication is that the program not only outcomes (through
skill accumulation), but also affects certain behavioral traits like relative confidence, which
can in the long run have a multiplier effect of labor market performance. This can also
influence other aspects of the individual’s well-being.
6 Do Behavioral Traits Matter?
There now exists a fairly large experimental literature that suggests that intrinsic traits
like risk preferences, competitiveness, confidence and patience can have potentially strong
effects on wage earnings and occupational choice. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) use
differences in competitiveness to explain wage gaps between men and women. Gneezy,
Leonard, and List (2009) and Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, List, and (2010) examine the
evolution of gender differences in competitiveness. Castillo, Petrie, and Torero (2010)
provide evidence using artefactual field experiments that differences in risk preferences
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have significant implications for occupational choices. Liu (2008) finds that more risk
averse (or more loss averse) farmers in rural China delay adoption of Bt cotton, a relatively
newer technological improvement. It has also been documented that the level of confidence
can affect wage rates (Fang and Moscarini, 2005) entrepreneurial behavior (Koellinger,
Minniti, and Schade, 2007) and behavior in financial markets (Biais, Hilton, Mazurier,
and Pouget, 2005). Given this background, it is worth examining whether the returns
to TRAINING depend on these baseline intrinsic characteristics. To do this we estimate
a version of equation (2) where we subdivide the sample on the basis of baseline (pre-
program) intrinsic characteristics using the experiments conducted in 2010.17 In this case
we estimate the following equation
Yit = β0 + β1TRAININGi + β2(TRAININGi × Zi) +
K∑
j=1
γjXij + εit (5)
where
Zi = {Risk Tolerance Low, Competitive, Self Assessment High, Self Rank High
Willing to Wait 150, Willing to Wait 200}
Here Risk Tolerance Low is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the proportion invested
in the risky asset in the investment game is less than 0.5 and 0 otherwise; Competitive is a
dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the woman chose the competitive payment scheme
in the competition game and 0 otherwise; Self Assessment High is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if the woman expected to fill 4 or more bags in the competition game
and 0 otherwise. Finally Self Ranking High is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if
the woman expects her rank in the competition game will be in the top two quantiles
and 0 otherwise. The corresponding estimates are presented in Table 12. Again, the
coefficient of interest is that associated with the interaction term, which captures the
differential impact. While the differential impact with respect to high self assessment
is never statistically significant, it is so for women who are more tolerant of risk, more
competitive and are more confident of their relative ability at the baseline; they have
better labor market outcomes post TRAINING. The likelihood of obtaining casual wage
17There now exists a fairly large literature that suggests that behavior in a laboratory setting is a good
predictor of behavior outside the laboratory environment. For example Karlan (2005) finds that individuals
identied as more trustworthy in a laboratory setting are more likely to repay their loans one year later.
Fehr and Goette (2007) find that nd that workers who exhibit loss aversion in a laboratory setting are
more likely to reduce effort in response to higher wages in an experiment on bicycle messengers.
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employment, full-time employment, self-employment, any employment, job search and
hours worked, income from self-employment and likelihood of owning a sewing machine
are all systematically lower for women who are less tolerant of risk. Monthly earnings
are also lower for women who are more less tolerant of risk, though the effect is not
statistically significant. The likelihood of obtaining casual wage employment, full-time
employment, any employment and hours worked are all significantly higher for women who
are competitive; the likelihood of obtaining full-time employment, self-employment, any
employment, hours worked and finally the earnings from self-employment are significantly
higher for women who can be categorized as being confident of their relative ability. The
differential effects (where significant) are also quite large. For example women who are
less tolerant of risk who receive the TRAINING are 26 percentage points less likely to
be employed and work for 4 less hours compared to women who are more tolerant of
risk women who receive the TRAINING; competitive women who receive the TRAINING
work for 7 more hours compared to the non competitive women who receive TRAINING;
Women who are more confident of their relative abilities and receive TRAINING are
close to 20 percentage points more likely to be employed, are likely to work for 4 more
hours in the week and earn Rs 500 more from self-employment compared to women who
are less confident of their relative abilities and receive TRAINING. Absolute confidence
and patience at the baseline does not however have a statistically significant effect on
the post program outcomes. The results presented in Table 12 therefore suggest that
intrinsic traits are important and can have significant impacts on the effectiveness of the
TRAINING program. Indeed, behavioral traits at the baseline can explain a large part
of the heterogeneity of outcomes, much more compared to observables like educational
attainment, religion, caste, dependency ratio and prior experience.
7 Ability Bias?
Random allocation of applicants to the treatment and control group enables us to (par-
tially) address the issue of selection bias arising from the fact that individuals of higher
ability (which is private information to the individual) choose to apply for the program and
therefore resulting in the returns to the training program being over estimated. However a
part of the ability bias persists because it is still possible that higher ability women (within
the treatment group) continue to do better post-training. So are the results driven by this
(unobserved) ability bias? Since ability is not observable to the researcher, it is typically
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difficult to obtain a measure of the extent of this ability bias. No test was conducted at
the baseline to measure the true ability of the applicants: what ever information we have
on ability at the baseline was self-reported prior experience in stitching and tailoring.
Recall however that the women had to fill bags with kidney beans in the specific real
effort task that the women had to participate in as a part of the experiment. Women in
India are used to handling the beans regularly they take them out in bowls, clean and
cook them, and all our participants are likely to be equally familiar with this particular
task. Performance in the specific real effort task (number of zip lock bags filled in one
minute) at the baseline could be used as an (imperfect) measure of ability. We estimate
the following equation
Yit = β0 + β1TRAININGi + β2(TRAININGi ×#ofBagsi) +
K∑
j=1
γjXij + εit (6)
Once again the coefficient of interest is β2. It gives us the marginal effect of an additional
bag filled at the baseline on the post training outcome variable. The regression results
presented in Table 13 show that the coefficient estimate β2 is never statistically significant,
indicating that the outcomes are not affected by baseline ability. There is no evidence of
ability bias driving the results.
8 Cost-Benefit Analysis
We present cost-benefit comparisons under two scenarios: first, for replicating the program
at a different location and second, for continuation of the existing program. Under the first
scenario, the NGO’s total cost of the underlying vocational education program amounts
to Rs 1810 per person18, including both fixed cost (e.g: machinery) and variable cost (e.g:
teacher salary and rent). The ITT effects of the program reported in Table 6 indicate that
the program increases annual earnings by Rs 1620. To compute the present discounted
value of future earnings, we assume the following: (a) the working life of these women to
be 40 years given that the average age of the respondent in our sample is 22 years, (b) 5
percent discount rate, (c) no appreciation or depreciation in annual earnings and (d) zero
opportunity cost of participation in the training program given that less than 1 percent
of the sample was employed in the pre-training period. Based on our ITT estimates and
these assumptions, we obtain the present discounted value of future earnings stream for
181USD = Rs 50 (approximately)
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a participant to be Rs 29160. This amounts to a net benefit of Rs 27350 per participant.
The total cost of the program can be recovered in less than two years. The TOT estimates
of the program are much larger and generate a greater income stream of Rs 52920 over
the participant’s working life. Given that approximately 50 percent of all individuals
who had access to the training program did not complete the program, the per unit cost
of the program increases to Rs 4232 per person and yet the associated net benefit of
the program remain substantially higher at Rs 48688. The net benefits computed using
both the ITT and TOT estimates suggest that there are large benefits from replicating
this program in other regions as long as the regional labor markets are distant from one
another. However, it needs to be noted that that these estimates do not reflect general
equilibrium costs and benefits of the vocational education program. Incorporating the
general equilibrium impacts are likely to change the returns, though it is not clear in
which direction. On the one hand, as more and more women are trained and enter the
labor market, the premium on training is likely to go down; on the other hand, if returns
to training are convex, then not incorporating this kind of non-linearity implies that the
returns to the program are likely to be under estimated.
Under the second scenario, the NGO only incurs variable cost such as teacher salary, rent
and equipment maintenance; all of which sum up to Rs 1538 per person. Under these
new cost calculations, the ITT estimates generate a net benefit of Rs 27622 and the TOT
estimates generate a net benefit of Rs 51382. There are considerable gains from both
continuing the program in the same location and replicating the program in a different
location.
The net benefits summarized here possibly represent lower bounds for the benefits of
the vocational-education program as they are based on short-run effects of the program,
and do not account for gains from savings on clothing expenditure, and empowerment.
Increase in women’s labor force participation and earnings can have an impact on children’s
human capital, and these potential intergenerational effects have not been accounted in
our computations.
Training programs of this kind therefore have significant benefits both for the program
participants and also firms (since they now have access to a more skilled workforce). The
returns to initiating such programs can therefore be substantial. This obviously leads
us to the next set of questions: why are there so few programs of this kind? Why are
there no private initiatives, or why are the firms themselves not offering programs for skill
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development, particularly since they are complaining about skill shortage? Why are there
no formal apprenticeship programs? What about government initiatives? From a policy
point of view these are crucial questions.
There are possibly a number of different reasons that explain the absence of such programs.
First, there is very little incentive for firms/entrepreneurs themselves to offer this kind of
programs aimed at skill development. This is because the skill that participants attain as
a part of such a program is not a firm specific skill. Therefore it is difficult for firms and
entrepreneurs to recover the cost of providing this training.
Second, one issue that was repeatedly re-iterated to us in informal conversations with the
different stake holders was the importance of local access. Women in India, particularly
those belonging to the socio-economic class where the program applicants are drawn from
typically face a large number of restrictions on mobility (they need permission to use pub-
lic transport, often need permission to visit family and friends and so on). So while there
are indeed similar programs offered by private organizations and the governments, these
programs are often centralized, implying that participants have to travel longer distances
to the training centres. This increases the cost of program attendance, which can act as
a barrier to skill accumulation. That convenient access and distance to (or time taken to
travel to) the training centre is crucial made clear in Figure 4, which shows a negative
relationship between the time taken to walk to the training centre and the likelihood of
program completion. Additionally, similar programs offered by government or private or-
ganizations can be expensive. It is not always clear that potential participants in programs
like this have a very good idea about the future returns and are therefore unwilling to invest
(even though we have shown that the full cost of the program can be recovered in about
two years). Programs therefore need to be accompanied by information/advertisement
campaigns specifically aimed at the target population, which highlight the returns from
such programs. Of course as a first step, one needs to get proper estimates of returns from
such programs, which is the primary aim of this paper.
Third, historically India has had a system of education that strongly resembles the so
called apprentice system that is common in many parts of the world. This was the so
called Gurukul system where the student (or disciple or the shishya) would reside at the
house of the guru (the teacher) and learn from him. Indeed one could even argue that
the caste system in India formalized the apprenticeship system of learning: occupations
were caste specific and one had to be born into a particular caste to be allowed to work
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in particular occupations. This also meant one became an apprentice almost from birth.
Labor markets in India have historically been organized along caste lines. An important
feature of these caste networks is that they are typically the most active in working class
(or blue collar) occupations, dominated by lower caste men. Women historically did not
participate in the labor market and hence did not benefit from these caste networks. This
also meant that when women chose to enter the labor market, they did not have the
caste based apprentice system to depend on. This of course could have very different
implications. Indeed Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) using data from Mumbai argue that
women actually benefitted because of this. They were not constrained by caste based
occupations and could choose occupations that would provide them with the highest return
and benefit the most from the process of globalization. This was not the case for men.
On the other hand it could also be that in the absence of any security (provided by caste
based occupational networks) women choose to exit the labor market. This in turn has
significant implications for growth policy.
9 Discussion
Youth underemployment, especially among less educated populations perpetuates poverty.
The situation is particularly dire for women in low income households, despite the fact that
it is now well accepted that increasing the income levels of women have strong current
and intergenerational impacts. For example children (particularly daughters) of skilled
mothers are likely to be more educated and are likely to be healthier. However, little
is known about how best to help women in low income households and communities in
developing countries to acquire skills, find jobs and increase self-employment.
There are a number of potential different policy options. One would be to inject credit
and reduce the credit constraints that appear to hamper the ability of women to take ad-
vantage of their entrepreneurial skills. Indeed the entire microfinance revolution was built
around this model - provide microloans that will serve as working capital for setting up
small businesses leading to increased income over time. However recent results are increas-
ingly skeptical of the success of such a model of development (see for example Karlan and
Valdivia, 2011). Using a field experiment in Sri Lanka de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff
(2009) find that while the average returns to capital injection to microenterprises is very
high (considerably higher than the average interest rates charged by microlenders), the
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effects are significantly gender biased. They argue that the capital injections generated
large profit increases for male microenterprise owners, but not for female owners. Similar
gender biased results are obtained by Fafchamps, McKenzie, Quinn, and Woodruff (2011)
and Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2011). This finding has potentially serious impli-
cations for development policy because most microlending organisations target women.
They argue that cash injections directed at women could be confiscated by their husbands
and other members of their household leading to considerable inefficiencies.
One alternative tool for expanding the labor market opportunities in these settings is voca-
tional education or skills training, which could help individuals learn a trade and acquire
the skills needed to take advantage of employment opportunities, and create successful
small businesses. One additional advantage to this kind of training is that it results in
human capital that is specific to the person undertaking the training. However, little is
known about the actual benefits of vocational education in developing countries. This
paper adds to this very limited literature by examining the short run impacts (on abor
market outcomes, empowerment, entrepreneurship and happiness) of participating in a
voluntary vocational training program. The short-run effects of the program presented
in this paper are extremely encouraging. We find that the program in a very short time
has generated substantial improvement in labor market outcomes for these women. In
particular, we find that women who were randomly offered a place in the training pro-
gram are 5 percentage points more likely to be self-employed compared to women who
were not offered the training. This is consistent with the large increase observed in the
percentage of women who buy a sewing machine between the two survey rounds. We also
find that chosen women are 11 percentage points more likely to look for a job and are on
an average working 2 more hours in the post-training period compared to those who were
not offered the training. The program also affected entrepreneurship. However we find the
training program has limited effects on empowerment and happiness, at least in the short
run. There are however significant externalities associated with the program - women who
receive the TRAINING are likely to be relatively more confident of their ability and this
in turn can have significant effects on other dimensions of their lives. These short run
effects that we obtain are much larger than those observed in developed countries and are
consistent with the rather small but growing literature on vocational education and labor
market outcomes in developing countries. Finally the program is highly cost effective and
there are considerable gains from both continuing the program in the current location and
replicating it in different locations.
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Figure 1: The Advertisement Campaign of the Program
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Figure 4: Walking time to training center and Program Completion
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Table 1: Outcome Variable included in our Analysis
Labor market
Casual wage employment: = 1 if the respondent is employed for casual wage
Full-time employment: = 1 if the respondent is employed full-time
Self-employment: = 1 if the respondent is self-employed
Any employment: = 1 if the respondent is employed
(casual, full-time, or self)
Hours worked: number of hours worked during the last week,
where hours worked is a continuous variable
Job search: = 1 if the respondent spends any time looking
for more work during the last week
Monthly wage earnings: total monthly earnings from wages
(casual and or full-time) during the last month
Earnings from self employment: total monthly earnings from self-employment
during the last month
Entrpreneurship, Empowerment and Happiness
Own sewing machine: = 1 if the respondent owns a sewing machine at home
Control over resources: = 1 if the respondents says she has the right to
choose/decide how tospend the money she has earned
Rosca membership: = 1 if the respondent is a member of a Rotating
Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA)/chit fund
Happy at work: A categorical variable taking the following four values:
4 if very satisfied; 3 if moderately satisfied;
2 if moderately dissatisfied; and 1 if not satisfied
Happy at home: A categorical variable taking the following four values:
4 if very satisfied; 3 if moderately satisfied;
2 if moderately dissatisfied; and 1 if not satisfied
Intrinsic/Behavioral Characteristics
Proportion allocated to proportion allocated to the risky option
the risky asset in the investment game
Competition wage = 1 1 if the women chose the competition wage scheme
in the competition game
Self assessment Number of bags the woman expects to fill
in the competition game
Self Ranking Estimate about her relative standing (rank)
in the competition game
Willing to Wait 150 = 1 if the woman prefers Rs 150 in a month
Willing to Wait 200 = 1 if the woman prefers Rs 200 in a month
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Table 2: Baseline Characteristics
Full Sample Treatment Control Treatment-Control F-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Labor Market Outcomes
Casual wage employment 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.91
(0.008) (0.34)
Full-time employment 0.032 0.034 0.027 0.007 0.23
(0.015) (0.62)
Self-employment 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.003 0.05
(0.013) (0.82)
Any employment 0.049 0.051 0.043 0.008 0.19
(0.019) (0.66)
Hours worked 0.93 1.10 0.53 0.57 2.63
(0.48) (0.11)
Hours worked 19 21.57 12.25 9.32 2.34
(if any employment = 1) (6.91) (0.13)
Job search 0.074 0.05 0.13 -0.08*** 10.59***
(0.02) (0.0012)
Monthly wage earnings 42.18 49.77 25.40 24.37 2.20
(29.51) (0.14)
Earnings from self-employment 27.60 14.86 55.78 -40.91 3.97**
(38.33) (0.046)
Monthly wage earnings 1253 1357.33 940 417.33 1.19
(if casual/full-time wage employment = 1) (717.67) (0.29)
Earnings from self-employment 1171.42 608 2580 -1972 5.25**
(if self-employment=1) (1538.46) (0.04)
Panel B: Entrepreneurship, Empowerment and Happiness
Own sewing machine 0.352 0.313 0.438 -0.125*** 8.34***
(0.04) (0.004)
Control over resources 0.411 0.41 0.39 0.02 0.29
(0.04) (0.58)
Rosca participation 0.114 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.11
(0.02) (0.74)
Happy at home 1.58 1.584 1.589 -0.004 0.001
(0.07) (0.94)




Table 2 (Continued): Baseline Characteristics
Full Sample Treatment Control Treatment-Control F-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel C: Socioeconomic characteristics
Age 22.33 22.40 22.19 0.21 0.17
(0.51) (0.68)
Completed secondary schooling 0.446 0.449 0.437 0.012 0.07
(0.04) (0.78)
Experience in stitching/tailoring 0.268 0.22 0.35 -0.13*** 10.06***
(0.03) (0.001)
Married 0.335 0.34 0.31 0.03 0.57
(0.04) (0.45)
SC 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.01 0.001
(0.04) (0.94)
Hindu 0.471 0.47 0.46 0.01 0.05
(0.04) (0.83)
Dependency ratio 0.263 0.27 0.24 0.03 0.35
(0.04) (0.55)
Sample Size 594 409 185
Standard errors reported in parentheses
p-value reported in parentheses for the F-stat reported in column 5
F stat is obtained from the regression of the treatment indicator on the variable
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Pre and Post Training Differences in Outcome Variables
Pre-Training Post Training
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference Diff-Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
[(6)-(3)]
Casual wage employment 0.014 0.006 0.008 0.060 0.012 0.048** 0.04**
(0.018)
Full-time employment 0.040 0.025 0.015 0.092 0.050 0.042 0.027
(0.03)
Self-employment 0.026 0.025 0.001 0.06 0.012 0.048** 0.047**
(0.02)
Any employment 0.057 0.044 0.013 0.13 0.06 0.07** 0.057*
(0.03)
Hours worked 1.31 0.50 0.81 3.50 1.17 2.33** 1.52*
(0.85)
Hours worked 22.65 11.42 11.21 26.88 18.7 8.18 -3.03
(if any employment = 1) (8.16)
Job search 0.052 0.12 -0.073*** 0.122 0.069 0.053* 0.126***
(0.02)
Monthly wage earnings 59.01 23.27 35.74 259.85 79.87 179.98* 144.24*
(82.67)
Monthly wage earnings 1357.33 925 432.33 2490.27 1587.5 902.77 470.44
(if casual/full-time wage employment = 1) (924.69)
Earnings from self-employment 17.62 64.90 -47.28 108.46 69.18 39.28 86.56
(104.38)
Earnings from self-employment 675.55 2580 -1904.44 1781.90 5500 -3718.09 -1813.65
(if self employment=1) (4166.99)
Own sewing machine 0.32 0.43 -0.11** 0.59 0.47 0.12** 0.23***
(0.06)
Control over resources 0.42 0.39 0.03 0.45 0.49 -0.04 -0.07
(0.067)
Rosca participation 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.049 0.038 0.011 0.001
(0.03)
Happy at home 1.562 1.566 -0.003 1.72 1.64 0.08 0.083
(0.098)
Happy at work 1.52 1.64 -0.12 1.66 1.63 0.03 0.15
(0.098)
Sample Size 345 159 345 159
Standard errors reported in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Resident of North Shahdara 0.117
(0.084)
Walking time to -0.009*
training center (in mins) (0.005)
Sample Size 345
Marginal Effects presented
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Effect of TRAINING. ITT Estimates
TRAINING Mean Control Sample Size
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Effect on Labor Market Outcomes
Casual wage employment 0.052*** 0.012 504
(0.016)
Full-time employment 0.032 0.05 504
(0.022)
Self-employment 0.051*** 0.012 504
(0.016)
Any employment 0.061** 0.06 504
(0.027)
Hours worked 1.960*** 1.17 504
(0.756)
Job search 0.066** 0.069 504
(0.029)
Monthly wage earnings 134.75** 79.87 504
(68.51)
Earnings from self-employment 22.41 69.18 504
(81.925)
Panel B: Effect on Entrepreneurship, Empowerment and Happiness
Own sewing machine 0.153*** 0.478 504
(0.046)
Control over resources -0.048 0.049 504
(0.049)
Rosca participation 0.004 0.065 504
(0.019)
Happy at home 0.076 1.648 504
(0.064)
Happy at work 0.031 1.635 504
(0.066)
Region fixed-effects included
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions control for a full set of pre-treatment characteristics
and lagged outcome variable
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Table 7: Effect of TRAINING on Index Measures. ITT Estimates
TRAINING
(1)









Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions control for a full set of pre-treatment characteristics









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Effect of Intensity of Training: Program Completion (TRAINED) and Proportion
of Days Attended. TOT Estimates
TRAINED First-stage Hansen ATTENDANCE First-stage Hansen
F statistic J statistic F statistic J statistic
(p-value) (p-value)
Panel A: Effect on Labor Market Outcomes
Casual wage employment 0.092*** 136.54 0.20 0.001*** 145.93 0.04
(0.028) (0.90) (0.0003) (0.98)
Full-time employment 0.059 134.75 3.20 0.0006 143.34 3.82
(0.039 (0.20) (0.0005) (0.14)
Self-employment 0.090*** 134.96 2.70 0.001*** 144.17 2.21
(0.030) (0.25) (0.0003) (0.33)
Any employment 0.110** 135.08 1.66 0.001** 143.83 2.34
(0.047) (0.43) (0.0006) (0.30)
Hours worked 3.483*** 134.50 1.19 0.045** 143.07 1.23
(1.341) (0.55) (0.018) (0.53)
Job search 0.114** 136.92 5.64* 0.0016** 148.19 4.85*
(0.051) (0.06) (0.0006) (0.09)
Monthly wage earnings 244.411** 133.48 0.53 3.040* 142.66 0.81
(118.132) (0.76) (1.649) (0.66)
Earnings from self-employment 26.889 135.42 4.40 0.53 144.04 4.38
(145.664) (0.11) (1.87) (0.11)
Panel B: Effect on Entrepreneurship, Empowerment and Happiness
Own sewing machine 0.279*** 134.25 1.60 0.0035*** 142.18 2.01
(0.083) (0.45) (0.001) (0.36)
Control over resources -0.091 135.43 3.69 -0.001 144.16 3.79
(0.087) (0.15) (0.001) (0.15)
Rosca participation 0.008 131.13 0.45 0.0007 177.79 0.51
(0.033) (0.79) (0.0004) (0.77)
Happy at home 0.136 136.10 0.38 0.002 144.33 0.42
(0.114) (0.82) (0.001) (0.81)
Happy at work 0.051 133.54 3.11 0.0006 142.29 3.12
(0.119) (0.21) (0.001) (0.20)
Sample Size 504 504
Region fixed-effects included
TRAINED and ATTENDANCE are both instrumented with treatment (TRAINING),
and its interaction with age and marrital status
Regressions control for a full set of pre-treatment characteristics and lagged outcome variable
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Baseline Characteristics from Artefactual Field Experiments
Variables Treatment Control Treatment-Control
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Socioeconomic Characteristics
Age 24.34 22.20 2.23**
(1.07)
Completed secondary schooling 0.38 0.47 -0.09
(0.09)
SC 0.58 0.59 -0.01
(0.09)
Experience in stitching/tailoring 0.48 0.52 -0.04
(0.09)
Married 0.52 0.36 0.15*
(0.09)
Dependency ratio 0.38 0.31 0.07
(0.10)
Hindu 0.98 0.98 0.00
(0.03)
Panel B: Behavioral Characteristics
Proportion allocated to risky option 51.86 50.90 0.96
in the investment game (3.72)
Competitive wage scheme 0.373 0.363 0.010
in competition game (0.09)
Self assessment of number of bags 4.21 4.53 -0.32
they could fill in the competition game (0.37)
Perceived rank within group 4.17 3.86 0.31*
(1=Lowest, 5=Highest) (0.18)
Number of bags actually filled 1.92 1.79 0.13
(0.12)
Willing to Wait 150‡ 0.25 0.34 0.09**
(0.04)
Willing to Wait 200‡ 0.40 0.43 0.03
(0.04)
Sample Size‡ 91 44
Standard errors reported in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
‡: Survey Data used. Number of treatment women = 345;
Number of control women = 159
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Table 11: Effect of TRAINING on Behavioral Characteristics. ITT Estimates
TRAINING Mean Control Sample Size
Proportion allocated to risky option -5.312 54.31 117
in the investment game (4.623)
Competitive wage scheme 0.080 0.38 117
in the competition game (0.103)
Self assessment of number of bags they could fill 0.152 4.12 117
in the competition game (0.416)
Perceived rank within the group 0.460** 3.51 117
in the competition game (0.223)
Willing to wait Rs 150 -0.031 0.36 504
(0.047)
Willing to wait Rs 200 -0.049 0.53 504
(0.048)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13: Ability Bias?
TRAINING TRAINING Joint Test Sample Size
× # Bags filled
Casual employment 0.071 0.017 1.80 135
(0.108) (0.052)
Full-time employment 0.092 -0.007 1.89 135
(0.111) (0.057)
Self-employment 0.214* -0.062 4.28** 135
(0.115) (0.049)
Any employment 0.126 -0.007 2.19 135
(0.132) (0.063)
Hours worked 1.860 0.495 1.87 135
(2.943) (1.534)
Job search 0.212* -0.042 4.65** 135
(0.122) (0.053)
Monthly wage earnings 393.018* -122.432 5.05** 135
(198.572) (89.179)
Earnings from self-employment 323.418 -142.194 0.14 135
(836.940) (385.816)
Own sewing machine 0.036 0.025 0.37 135
(0.136) (0.059)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions control for a full set of pre-treatment characteristics
and lagged outcome variable
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A.1 Appendix




















Robust standard errors in parentheses
Region fixed-effects included
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A-3: Are Attriting Women Different? Empowerment, Entrepreneurship
and Happiness at Baseline
Own Control Rosca Happy Happy
sewing over participation at home at work
machine resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment -0.039 0.032 0.022 0.005 -0.109
(0.043) (0.046) (0.031) (0.074) (0.072)
Age -0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.006 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010)
Completed secondary schooling 0.017 0.058 0.057* -0.193*** -0.094
(0.038) (0.042) (0.029) (0.072) (0.070)
Married -0.016 0.164** -0.027 -0.231* -0.241*
(0.069) (0.081) (0.043) (0.123) (0.123)
Hindu 0.032 0.064 0.042 0.247** 0.197*
(0.060) (0.061) (0.043) (0.118) (0.116)
SC -0.002 0.017 0.058** 0.030 0.103
(0.039) (0.041) (0.029) (0.073) (0.070)
Experienced in 0.515*** 0.122** 0.108*** -0.032 0.030
stitching/tailoring (0.045) (0.052) (0.037) (0.084) (0.084)
Dependency ratio -0.002 -0.029 -0.003 0.062 0.076
(0.044) (0.053) (0.027) (0.087) (0.078)
Resident of North Shahdara 0.047 -0.226*** 0.058 0.251** 0.082
(0.060) (0.064) (0.042) (0.120) (0.120)
Attrite -0.161 -0.910*** 0.159 0.593 0.607
(0.319) (0.314) (0.217) (0.786) (0.801)
Attrite×Treatment -0.108 0.020 0.019 -0.021 0.023
(0.105) (0.115) (0.082) (0.199) (0.203)
Attrite×Age -0.001 0.020 -0.002 -0.011 -0.029
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.028) (0.028)
Attrite×Completed 0.099 0.163 0.006 -0.256 -0.273
secondary schooling (0.089) (0.104) (0.073) (0.180) (0.177)
Attrite×Married 0.050 0.010 -0.154 0.577 0.639*
(0.175) (0.198) (0.108) (0.360) (0.371)
Attrite×Hindu 0.068 0.043 0.009 -0.119 0.016
(0.158) (0.172) (0.094) (0.357) (0.349)
Attrite×SC 0.010 0.186* -0.017 0.005 -0.050
(0.101) (0.110) (0.078) (0.208) (0.219)
Attrite× Experience 0.102 0.224* 0.144 0.075 -0.143
in stitching/tailoring (0.119) (0.126) (0.128) (0.251) (0.256)
Attrite×Dependency -0.036 0.107 0.051 -0.052 -0.096
ratio (0.102) (0.115) (0.055) (0.181) (0.178)
Attrite×Resident of 0.204 0.329* -0.127 -0.313 0.093
North Shahdara (0.154) (0.177) (0.105) (0.366) (0.360)
Constant 0.205 0.433*** -0.063 1.295*** 1.257***
(0.135) (0.144) (0.087) (0.222) (0.233)
F-test 0.87 2.02** 0.81 1.31 0.64
Observations 594 594 594 594 594
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-4: Certificate Effect?
ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE Joint Test Sample Size
× TRAINED
Panel A: Effect on Labor Market Outcomes
Casual wage employment 0.003 -0.002 0.59 504
(0.013) (0.014)
Full-time employment -0.027 0.031 1.04 504
(0.036) (0.039)
Self-employment 0.018 -0.018 0.07 504
(0.021) (0.023)
Any employment -0.014 0.017 0.93 504
(0.031) (0.034)
Hours worked 0.267 -0.246 0.10 504
(0.689) (0.755)
Job search 0.055 -0.059 0.58 504
(0.053) (0.058)
Monthly wage earnings -26.974 33.213 0.44 504
(98.976) (108.297)
Earnings from self-employment 123.362 -135.669 0.78 504
(137.963) (151.485)
Panel B: Effect on Entrepreneurship, Empowerment and Happiness
Own sewing machine -0.046 0.055 2.10 504
(0.058) (0.064)
Control over resources 0.050 -0.057 0.95 504
(0.065) (0.072)
Rosca participation -0.009 0.010 0.24 504
(0.022) (0.024)
Happy at home -0.004 0.007 0.18 504
(0.052) (0.057)
Happy at work 0.027 -0.029 0.10 504
(0.064) (0.070)
Region fixed-effects included
ATTENDANCE and ATTENDANCE × TRAINED are both instrumented
with treatment (TRAINING),
and its interaction with age and marrital status
Regressions control for a full set of pre-treatment characteristics and lagged outcome variable
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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